

5-3338

6 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Bradley Article on EDC

1. Believe this is very good. Have read it very carefully and see no reason why you shouldn't sponsor it.

2. Suggest following clearance procedure:

25X1 [] to get it cleared through State by Merchant and Nolting by Monday p.m.

25X1 [] to get Mr. Kyes to clear it through Defense by Monday p.m.

25X1 [] to look at it to see if it needs AEC clearance and if so get that by Monday p.m.

3. If any of above raise items they wish to discuss with the authors, it be arranged for Tuesday a.m. with [] and Colonel Clifton of National War College. 25X1

4. The Saturday Evening Post must have this by Wednesday, 10 March at noon.

25X1
[]
Lyman-B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General 25X1A

ER-File

Army review(s)
completed.

DOCUMENT NO. 3
NO CHANGE IN REC. ☒
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HENS. B. 100
ACQ. 100
ENTR. 19 MAR 81 RECLASSIFIED 6008021

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

25X1A

TO : []

DATE: 5 March 1954

FROM : [] O/NE []

DOCUMENT NO. []

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐☐ DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. EXTENSION TO: 10-30-2011

REVIEWED BY: []

DATE: 19 MAR 81

REVIEWED BY: []

25X1A

Bradley article on EDC

SUBJECT:

1. We have previously been shooting for 2 May publication in the Satevepost, but in view of the strong effort now being made to secure French EDC ratification by 16 April, the Bradley article must be out before this date if we are to avoid the risk of being too late. We believe the Post will be willing to publication in the 7 April issue (which would give maximum impact), but only if the article is fully cleared and given to them by the morning of 10 March.

2. Colonel Clifton, the author, believes that if this extremely short deadline is to be met, CIA must handle the clearance process.

3. We believe that clearance will be required from State, Defense, and AEC, (on the atomic references). If the deadline is to be met the fastest possible clearance will be required, culminating if necessary in a meeting Tuesday at which we and the above agencies could discuss any required changes.

IS RUSSIA WINNING THE BATTLE FOR EUROPE?**By General of the Army Omar N. Bradley****Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

Late one rainy afternoon in September of 1952, General Ridgway and I were standing beside a small, grey-stucco German farmhouse just west of the River Rhine. Before us, the terrain sloped gently downward to a large potato patch with woods nearby. The roar of airplane engines and the sharp reports of opening parachutes filled the skies. Vivid splashes of color spread across the somber landscape as the red, white, orange and blue 'chutes lowered their burdens—nearly one thousand crack French paratroopers, their field pieces, ammunition, food, medical supplies, even trucks lashed to wooden platforms which struck the muddy earth of the potato patch with an echoing thunderclap.

The airborne Frenchmen quickly organized their equipment and took cover in the woodland. The U. S. Air Force planes which had dropped them disappeared in the distance. Soon the noise died down until once again the only sound we could hear was the quiet drizzle of the rain on the tile roof of the farmhouse. Then a regiment of U. S. Army ground forces charged onto the scene. Small-arms fire crackled, the field pieces roared, demolition charges geysered German farmland into the air—while umpires rushed about to decide how the "battle" was going. For this was an important exercise in the first large-scale military maneuvers to be held by the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The problem in this particular action was to wipe out a Rhine-crossing bridgehead before westbound "Soviet" troops could exploit it and thus be set to complete a theoretical conquest of Germany—with France next.

In a window of the farmhouse, an old German wearing a battered black felt hat propped his elbows on the sill and stolidly surveyed the ruin of his potato patch. He pulled on a home-made cigarette, stroked his grey, stubbly

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beard reflectively, and summed up his impression of this foreign troop rehearsal for the "liberation" of his farm.

"Ach!" he exclaimed. "It is a crazy world. Everyone is defending the Fatherland except her own sons."

Unhappily, the German farmer's remark is just as valid today as it was when he made it more than eighteen months ago. In fact, three and one half years have elapsed since the defense ministers of NATO agreed it was impossible to defend western Europe against the Russians without an effective German military contribution to the west's rearmament program. The Germans are ready and willing, and enough U. S. equipment for the first six German divisions is available right now. But quibbling and delay--primarily of French origin--have now brought this situation to the point that the Soviet Union is dangerously close to winning a major strategic victory without firing a shot.

When I relinquished the chairmanship of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff last August, I did not anticipate that the program for the defense of western Europe would be in a state of such crisis in this spring of 1954 that the United States would be forced, simply as a matter of military realism, to think of certain dreadful alternatives to the orderly buildup of western strength on the European continent as previously agreed upon in the deliberations of NATO. I shall explore these alternatives later in this article. First, however, I should like to make a report on the existing situation--a report I feel obligated to make at this time because the crisis is acute, because my past experience with NATO is an intimate one which in some respects is unique, and because my present military status permits me a degree of public candor not always available to one while still in high position.

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Western Europe is not just a piece of real estate which could be traded for time—not in any World War III. Its resources, greater in most respects than those of the entire communist bloc, constitute the balance of power between the Soviet and the civilized worlds, the potential difference between freedom and enslavement. For example, the United States at present has nearly twice the steel production of all the Soviet nations. But the steel mills of a conquered western Europe plus those the communists already have could turn this great advantage into a deficit amounting to more than one-fourth of existing American steel production. Estimates by any other yardstick—raw materials, population, industrial production, economic strength—come to the same conclusion: That western Europe, free, tips the scales in our favor; that western Europe, conquered, weights the balance in favor of communism. The defense of western Europe is therefore of as much concern to the United States as the defense of New York, Detroit, or the British Isles. If western Europe should, by its continuing weakness, tempt the Kremlin aggressors unendurably and fall into Soviet hands, the future of the United States would not be pleasant to contemplate—not to mention the even more immediate future of the western European populations.

Having served with many of the illustrious French generals, having held the field leadership of the American armies in the liberation of France in World War II, I have a deep and abiding respect for the French and for their leadership in Europe. But having witnessed the devastating effects of the atomic bomb, and having seen the motion pictures of our hydrogen bomb tests, I feel that another liberation of Europe, in the atomic-hydrogen bomb era, would be a strategic impossibility.

Tactical atomic weapons—bombs, missiles, cannon—could on the other hand be of major importance in the defense, as opposed to the liberation, of

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western Europe. The United States has led the world in this field. It could do more in this respect toward strengthening our European allies, including France, and I shall elaborate on this thought presently. But tactical atomic weapons are of no real value without sufficient ground strength to force an invading army to mass itself into a suitable target. The achievement of that sufficient ground strength in western Europe will be realized only when the German contribution, so long delayed [by French intransigence], becomes available.

The first objective of the United States, in this age of atomic and hydrogen bombs, is the prevention of war. We do not care whether the Soviets believe this or not, but we do want our allies to know it. Two principal deterrents to war have been created since the prostration of Europe in the last war: (1) The North Atlantic alliance, and (2) the U. S. Strategic Air Command with its nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them en masse. One without the other is not enough.

The Soviet Union might have neutralized our Strategic Air Command by agreeing in the United Nations to complete atomic disarmament—when the Russians had few A-bombs and we had many. But the Soviet leaders could not figure their way around the respected ground and air capability of NATO. So they had to stop the progress of the NATO build-up, started so faithfully among the western allies in 1949, and now slowed to a puzzled gait in 1954. They struck, logically, at the heart of the matter—the German contribution.

within a system of super powers

The Soviets have pressured the Germans. They have tempted the French. They have propagandized the Italians. At the recent foreign ministers' conference in Berlin, they held out the hope of settling the Indo-China war at the Geneva conference scheduled to begin April 26—once the Korean question was out of the way—^{with the} and achieved their obvious objective of giving the French a reason for further ^a delay on agreeing to German rearmament. ^{contribution to the E.A.C.}

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The simple military fact of the matter is that a strong, defensible western Europe needs both France and Germany. The sole interest of the United States is a Franco-German rapprochement in their mutual interest and in our own. After all, because of an accident of geography, France can count on German forces to defend France while defending herself. I find it hard to see who would benefit more from a reasonable degree of German defensive strength than France itself.

The ~~crux of the matter~~^{problem} is one of emotion rather than logic. To state it baldly, some Frenchmen seem to fear the Germans more than they fear the Russians. I recall vividly how a meeting of NATO defense ministers, held in Washington in ~~November~~^{October} of 1950, was thrown into an uproar verging on the hysterical when we got down to the hard question of how we were to achieve an admittedly essential contribution of twelve German divisions to Europe's defenses.

The United States proposed that a rearmcd West Germany be admitted to full partnership in NATO. Jules Moch, then the French minister of defense, exploded in protest. Mue. Moch, present as his adviser, supported him vehemently. The suggestion was utterly unthinkable. M. and Mue. Moch, French patriots of the highest order, had both been in German concentration camps during World War II. They lost their only son in that war. They knew of Nazi racial persecutions at first hand. Their own bitter memories of Germans in uniform are shared, in varying degrees, by millions of their countrymen in a nation thrice invaded by Germans within a period of seventy years.

Can an American understand the depth of such emotions? I think I can, for I recall how I once learned that the War between the States--the American civil war--was not really over. Upon first being ordered to Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1925, I found that the one small army marching through Georgia under Sherman in 1864 had left a deep and lasting hurt, still felt so many decades afterward. When I contrast this with three German conquests and occupations of France, I believe I can readily appreciate French feelings.

But understandable as it was, the effect of M. Moch's emotional upheaval was such that additional meetings had to be held in London and Brussels the following month to pick up the pieces of the shattered conference. It was at the Brussels session that the atmosphere on the German question changed

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from one of despair to one of hope. For the French advanced the concept of a European Defense Community—an organization within NATO, composed of France, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy, which would raise an international army made up of troops from these six nations which, logically, must furnish the bulk of the manpower for defending western Europe in any event. Control of this international army and the licensing of its arms production would not rest in any single nation, but in an international commissariat or defense department which in turn would fit in its defense plans with those of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, the top continental command post of NATO. The EDC would also have its own tactical air force and, after a period of transition, a common defense budget to which the six nations would contribute.

Let me emphasize the point that the European Defense Community, or EDC, is not an American idea; it is a French proposal, designed primarily to make German rearmament acceptable because it would be controlled. Let me also note that the need for a German contribution to European defense is not just an American notion, but the result of a NATO-wide agreement. It might be added as an ironical footnote that the communists are partially responsible for the EDC they are now trying to kill, for they started the Korean war, which in turn caused a sense of danger and urgency in Europe contributing to the decision that Germany must be rearmed.

France's NATO allies gladly accepted the French EDC proposal, in December of 1950. Germany, too, was happy to go along with EDC as an alternative to the original idea of a full NATO membership for the Bonn government, [inasmuch as the latter might have been interpreted at that time as an implied recognition by the free world of a permanent division of Germany.] But it was not until May of 1952 that the EDC treaty was signed subject to ratification by the parliaments of the

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six nations. Now, two more years later, only the Netherlands and West German parliaments have ratified the treaty, the Belgians have partially done so, but Luxembourg, Italy and France have not. Luxembourg and Italy appear to be waiting for France. Why has France not acted?

Part of the answer may be found in the protracted debate between December of 1950 and May of 1952 over the form in which German troops would be organized under EDC. France at first proposed that the German units be made no larger than battalions. This was rejected as militarily unworkable. Then, at a meeting of NATO military authorities in Canada in September of 1951, came a French proposal that EDC divisions be made up of three regimental combat teams—for example, one French, one German and one Belgian.

During a recess of the meeting at which this proposal was made, I remarked, "Gentlemen, now that we are off the record, I have a suggestion. Each of you commanded a division or more in the last war. So would each of you who would be willing to lead a division in battle with regiments of three different nationalities kindly raise his hand?"

No one, including the French general present, raised his hand. This incident disposed of the proposal, for it illustrated, dramatically, what all of us knew in our hearts as men of military experience—that an international army, if it is to be efficient, must be broken by nationalities into units no smaller than a division. Differences of language, temperament, procedure, habit and training would otherwise produce only wild disorder. [The fact that the French had to be worked up gradually, starting with battalions, until they were willing to face the prospect of German divisions, is a reflection of the French national fears which are no less time-consuming for the fact that their root causes are easily identified.]

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It is not that the French are lacking in political leaders of courage and determination. For example, at the NATO meeting in Lisbon, in February of 1952, prospects for an EDC treaty seemed dismal. The issue was whether France could commit herself to raising twelve and one-third divisions so her forces in EDC would, among other considerations, be slightly larger than the proposed new German army. The problem was financial. Robert A. Lovett, then the U. S. Secretary of Defense, explained that he had already squeezed out the last dollar of American funds available for military aid to France. To meet the goal, France would have to increase her military budget—and, it appeared, it would be political suicide to increase the French military budget by one more franc.

There the matter rested when I was summoned rather mysteriously to a dinner that evening which my aide, his French opposite number and an American radio correspondent had arranged, explaining only that they wanted me to cancel any other engagement I might have. I discovered that the other guest was none other than the Premier of France, then Edgar Faure. I think he was as surprised as I. It was a pleasant social occasion, and it was also the first opportunity M. Faure had had to sit down with a military man, in an atmosphere of private conversation rather than the tension of a formal international conference, to discuss the military necessities of the situation.

As the evening concluded, M. Faure sighed and said, "Very well, I shall announce tomorrow morning that we shall raise the twelve and one third divisions and that we shall increase our military budget to meet the costs. But I must tell you that my government will fall within thirty days."

Next morning, the Premier was as good as his word, and as a result the signing of the EDC treaty took place in Paris three months later. By then,

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as M. Faure had predicted, his government had fallen—it lasted thirty-two days instead of thirty. The interesting point is that while M. Faure made the great personal sacrifice of taking a step he knew would turn him out of office, the French honored the commitment he made and continue to honor it today, even while delaying treaty ratification. This incident illustrates the political realities which any French government faces in dealing with the vexed question of German rearmament. I might add that the fact I have dwelt at some length upon a personal experience with M. Faure does not by any means indicate that I am insensible of the high courage and fortitude of Premier Laniel and Foreign Minister Georges Bidault in the difficult roles they must presently play with respect to EDC.

Yet I am convinced from my numerous associations with prominent Frenchmen and American observers that a large majority of Frenchmen are not opposed to German rearmament per se. Perhaps seventy percent of the French people would almost certainly accept some form of it, and I know that the high military authorities of France are convinced of the need for a German contribution. What, then, are the inhibitions on French ratification of the EDC treaty?

Many Frenchmen oppose EDC because they fear it would mean subordination of France within a larger European community in which France's historic identity would be lost. This is the principal nationalistic argument against EDC. I can readily understand the fears of my French military colleagues that EDC might mean the progressive disappearance of the French army, the French navy, the French air force, as these entities have existed in the past. But all nations must accept some limitations on their sovereignty in meeting a common need, particularly when that need could be a matter of national life or death.

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The United States, for example, is no longer a free agent; it must keep its policies in accord with those of thirteen NATO allies, and its military strategy, insofar as Europe is concerned, is subject not ^{just} to the direction of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, but to the NATO Standing Group, and, under it, SHAPE. I feel that the United States should and will go even farther in this direction by, among other things, adopting the Belgian infantry rifle which has been accepted as standard by our western European allies.

Another French fear of EDC is that it might become a vehicle for German domination of western Europe, including France. This contention is difficult to understand, for it is precisely what the EDC, beyond all other suggested methods of German rearmament, is designed to avoid. The plain fact is that German rearmament is coming, one way or another, and it would seem to me to be far safer, from the French viewpoint, to have that rearmament under control of EDC decisions on which the French would have a veto. A strong and reviving Germany will inevitably play an influential role in European affairs. Indeed, it is French recognition of this fact which creates French fears. But this development cannot be met by avoiding the issue of rearmament or raising the [spurious] cry [as one French statesman did recently] that EDC is "a French march to American music."

Might not a rearmed Germany drag France into a new war by attacking the Soviet Union? This is a risk under any form of German rearmament. The greater risk is a Soviet attack on a disarmed Germany. The point is that the security of free Europe is indivisible and the best way to lay the ghost of German aggression is to deprive Germany of an independent military establishment through EDC, in my opinion.

The recent Berlin conference should have made it painfully clear, to any who may not have already been convinced, that the Soviet Union will not voluntarily

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give up control over East Germany under any circumstances. Mr. Molotov has answered, far better than I could, the theory also heard in France that ratification of EDC might prevent a German settlement. For he has made it perfectly evident that the Soviets will retreat from Germany only when they are convinced they must, and I cannot see how a strong European Defense Community would do anything but advance the date of that happy event, distant as it may now seem.

France has other important concerns in this matter, including a desire amounting almost to a passion to obtain a favorable settlement of her dispute with Germany over the Saar Basin as a pre-condition to ratification of the EDC treaty. Uppermost at the moment, however, is the issue of whether ratification would impair the possibility of securing a settlement of the conflict in Indo-China.

Here we see the blackmailing nature of communist power politics at its most naked. Make no mistake about it--the Soviet Union understands the importance of the European Defense Community, and the best evidence is her efforts to defeat it. Russia has made a show of easing east-west tensions, offered trade to our NATO allies, dangled a non-aggression and mutual assistance pact with the USSR before the French, all with the purpose of undermining EDC. And finally, we have the clear implication from the communists that if the French want to end the war in Indo-China, they had better let EDC die on the vine.

No American could fail to sympathize with the French desire to relieve herself of the burden of the eight-year-old Indo-China war, least of all an American military man who for the last three years of his active duty lived daily with the casualty lists from Korea. The United States, too, has a substantial stake in the Indo-Chinese conflict. But the whole history of international experience

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with the communist bloc has proven, time and time and time again, that only those negotiations undertaken from a position of western strength have any prospect of success for the west. As always, the communists at Geneva will be playing upon allied disunity and here again, it seems to me, a functioning EDC represents a strength of a nature the communists understand and respect, while a still-pending or threatened EDC represents a Soviet weapon.

What more can the United States do to aid the cause of EDC, to prevent the cheap but gravely significant victory that international communism would win by default should EDC fail? This nation has poured six billions of dollars in Marshall Plan and military aid into France, has pumped hundreds of millions more in military aid for the war in Indo-China through the economy of continental France, has supported five divisions of her own in Europe for years, built up air strength on the continent—I hardly need labor the point. With specific reference to EDC, we have accepted virtually every French demand for modifications, stipulations, protocols, and agreements designed to counter French fears that a rearmcd Germany might prove to be a Frankenstein's monster which would turn on its creators.

Perhaps there is still more that we can do. One possibility is that the United States will urge an extension to fifty years of the present twenty-year NATO pact, which commits us to mutual defense assistance with thirteen other nations. Recently there have been indications from London of a British intent to make additional concessions as further incentive to France—perhaps including commitment of British troops to the European army.

The success of EDC is a matter of such overriding importance that whatever is needed to insure that success must be done. I have long advocated that our

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Atomic Energy Act be liberalized so we can go further in sharing knowledge of nuclear weapons with our allies, and President Eisenhower recently urged Congress to take this step. Information on what the bomb is, how to use it, how to get the best results from it, is necessary so our allies can incorporate the bomb in their military plans. Once our allies have the benefit of all the atomic information their ground commanders and their air commanders need, the next logical step would be to make tactical atomic weapons available to our allies or at least to pledge their instant availability in the event of war. France, for example, has a superb new jet fighter-bomber known as the Mystere which is already equipped for handling tactical A-bombs.

But how can we expect the Congress to take even the first step, of making more atomic information available, so long as France continues to react, illogically, against her own brain-child, the EDC? The Congressional attitude on EDC was made evident in adoption of the Richards amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1953. This amendment, now American law, provided that fifty percent of U. S. military aid authorized for NATO should be withheld until EDC is in effect. The practical effect of the amendment is that all American military aid to the six EDC nations will stop next January unless (a) Congress repeals the amendment (which is most unlikely) or (b) EDC is ratified. The deadline would be even earlier if it were not for the fact that we still have a backlog of military assistance funds appropriated before the Richards amendment became effective.

Thus the eventual availability of tactical atomic weapons for use by our allies and the continued flow of U. S. military assistance both hinge on the ratification of EDC. France need have no fear that the United States or the

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United Kingdom will withdraw their forces from Europe so long as there is hope of holding the continent. The real threat of a U. S.-U. K. withdrawal would arise only from a conviction that the continent could not be defended. Thus it seems to me, in the light of my experience with NATO which began from the moment of NATO's birth, that French ratification of the EDC treaty and a start on German rearmament are precisely the steps most needed at this moment to revive NATO confidence and to convince the United States and Great Britain that NATO can achieve an adequate defense. If the French are worried about an American "retreat to isolationism," they have the opportunity to administer the best possible antidote.

But, as a soldier, I can see only three unfortunate alternatives which ^{be} would/open to the United States if EDC should fail.

We could go back to our original proposal that Germany be made a member of NATO. France would undoubtedly veto this step.

We could rearm Western Germany by ourselves, or with the help of Great Britain if London wished to go along with this proposition, but with or without British help, we could do it.

Or we could make the "agonizing reappraisal" of our military position which could only, in all military logic, lead to withdrawal of U. S. troops from the European continent to Great Britain, the Azores, Spain, Northern Africa, Greece and Turkey--in other words shift to a policy of peripheral defense of Europe.

One has only to look squarely at these alternatives and their potential repercussions to understand why I feel so strongly the failure of EDC would hand the Soviet Union a major strategic victory in Europe without pulling a single trigger. Yet if an adequate western European defense cannot be achieved, for lack of German troops, what can we do except to consider the alternatives?